

omandis is famous for its six burial grounds from Late Antiquity and esp. for the magnificently furnished tomb of the so-called *chef militaire*, whose grave-gifts point to an eastern Germanic group of peoples with a strong Pontic-Danubian tradition [1; 2] (on Germanic and Sarmatian troops in the area of the V.: Not. Dign. Occ. 42,65; 42,67). After the bishopric, that was acquired in Late Antiquity, was lost to Noviomagus [4] (probably in AD 531), Viromandis declined in importance.

1 D. SCHORSCH, The Vermand Treasure, in: Metropolitan Museum Journal 21, 1986, 17–40 2 C. VON CARNAP-BORNHEIM, Kaiserzeitliche germanische Tradition im Fundgut des “Chef militaire” in Vermand, in: T. FISCHER (ed.), Germanen beiderseits des spätantiken Limes, 1999, 41–61.

R. BEDON, Atlas des villes, bourgs, villages de France au passé romain, 2001, 321 f.; J.-L. COLLART, Le déplacement du chef-lieu des V. au Bas-Empire à Vermand, in: Revue archéologique de Picardie 3/4, 1984, 245–258; Id., Vermand, in: J.P. PETIT, M. MANGIN (eds.), Atlas des agglomérations secondaires de la Gaule Belgique et des Germanies, 1994, 230 f. (No. 269). F.SCH.

**Virtue** (ἀρετή/*areté*; ‘fitness’, ‘excellence’; Latin *virtus*).  
A. ARCHAIC PERIOD B. SOCRATES, PLATO,  
ARISTOTLE C. HELLENISTIC AND ROMAN PHI-  
LOSOPHY D. CHRISTIANITY

#### A. ARCHAIC PERIOD

The term ‘virtue’ has pre-philosophical and philosophical meanings. Pre-philosophical conceptions (in, for example, Greek epic and Archaic elegy, historiography and the Attic orators) correspond to a heroic and political ethics, whose main characteristics are practical wisdom and courage as well as the pursuit of fame and the avoidance of shame. On the other hand, the Delphic Maxims, ascribed to the → Seven Sages, proclaim ‘know yourself’, ‘nothing to excess’.

The transformation from unquestioned traditional morality to philosophical reflection in the 6th and 5th cents. was a result of increasing complexity in the social order. Otherwise intractable conflicts could be resolved by the establishment of transindividual norms (e.g. Solon’s *eunomia* (→ Solon [1])). The emergence of the notion that the soul (*psyché*; → Soul, theory of the) is the true seat of responsibility led to an internalization of morality; actions are no longer judged by their result but by their intention. The fundamental distinction between external and internal goods is first discussed by → Heraclitus I [1] (22 B 119 DK) and → Democritus [1] (68 B 171 DK). Certain → Sophists attacked traditional morality as mere convention (*nómos*) and made the natural, unrestrained satisfaction of desire (ἐπιθυμία/*epithymía* and πλεονεξία/*pleonexía*) into the measure of → happiness (*eudaimonía*; e.g. → Antiphon [4], → Thrasymachus; Pl. Grg. 482e–3e; Thuc. 5,105,2).

#### B. SOCRATES, PLATO, ARISTOTLE

The Socratic question of how one should live leads to further self-examination: instead of wealth, prestige or other external goods, a person’s primary concern should be striving for the perfection of his (or her) own soul (*epimeleisthai tēs psychēs*, Pl. Ap. 29d–e; 36c). → Socrates [2] sought to learn, in conversation with others, what virtue is, what kind of knowledge it is, and whether it can be taught. Socrates’ inquiry into the nature of virtue already implies an → ethics of dialogue. → Plato [1], further intellectualized and ‘moralized’ the concept of virtue. He also developed the influential schema of the four cardinal virtues: wisdom (σοφία/*sophía* or φρόνησις/*phronēsis*), courage (ἀνδρεία/*andreía*), self-mastery (σωφροσύνη/*sōphrosynē*), justice (δικαιοσύνη/*dikaíosynē*, Resp. 427e ff.; 442b–d); in Cicero’s Latin *sapientia* or *prudentia*, *fortitudo*, *temperantia* and *iustitia*. In Plato and, more clearly, later in → Middle Platonism and → Neoplatonism, the human and the divine good (τὸ ἀγαθόν/*tò agathón*) coincide (Pl. Resp. 505d–e): the goal is to fulfil man’s intellectual nature by the assimilation to the divine (Pl. Tht. 176a–b; Plot. 1,2,7).

Aristotle (→ Aristoteles [6]) draws a distinction between ethical (ἠθικὴ/*ēthikē*) and intellectual (διανοητικὴ/*dianoētikē*) virtue (Aristot. Eth. Nic. 6). He does not confine the former to the four cardinal virtues, but includes, for example, generosity (ἐλευθεριότης/*eleutheriōtēs*), greatness of soul (μεγαλοψυχία/*megalo-psychía*), and truthfulness (cf. ἀληθευτικός/*alētheutikós*; Aristot. Eth. Nic. 3,6–9; 4). He conceives of the ethical virtues as intermediacy (*mesotēs*) between excess and deficiency. Aristotle returns in part to the older ethics and its practical conception of the wise life: happiness is comprised not only of the goods of the soul, but also the bodily and external goods. Virtue is not acquired primarily by insight, but by habituation (*ēthos*; Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1103a–b).

#### C. HELLENISTIC AND ROMAN PHILOSOPHY

The Hellenistic schools of philosophy further debated on whether virtue alone is sufficient for happiness, or if other goods are also necessary. In → Stoicism, virtue is the sole constituent of happiness: the virtuous life is in accordance with nature and reason (*kat’ empeirian tōn phýsei symbainóntōn zēn*, Diog. Laert. 7,87). For → Epicurus, the greatest good is no longer virtue, but → pleasure (*hēdonē*). Virtue thus becomes a means to happiness, rather than being constitutive of it. Accordingly, the → Epicurean School strove primarily for freedom from fear and guilt.

The Roman concept of virtue fused traditional Roman morality with Greek philosophical conceptions. Derived from *vir* (‘man’), *virtus* initially signified ‘manliness’, ‘courage’ (*fortitudo*: Cic. Tusc. 2,18). The ‘pre-philosophical’ striving of the Roman elite for glory merged with the Stoic conception of virtue mediated by → Panaetius [4]. Cicero further developed this fusion, with virtues such as trustworthiness (*fides*) and devo-

tion to parents and family (*pietas*); his understanding of Roman virtue was fundamentally political (Cic. Off. 1,153; Rep. 1,22). Especially in → Seneca [2], → Epictetus [2], → Plutarchus [2] and → Marcus [II 2] Aurelius, Socratic self-examination was fostered by new and more refined means of self-formation, and taught as → popular philosophy.

#### D. CHRISTIANITY

Christianity adopted the four cardinal virtues, while (1 Cor 13) complementing and transforming them with the specifically Christian virtues of faith (πίστις, → *pístis*, Latin *fides*), hope (ἐλπίς/*elpís*, Latin *spes*) and love (ἀγάπη/→ *agápē*, Latin *caritas*). Essential components of virtue were now obedience (LXX: ἐπακρόασις/*epakróasis*, vulg. Latin: *oboedientia*), humility (ταπεινοφροσύνη/*tapeinophrosýnē*, Latin *humilitas*) and penitence (μετάνοια/*metánoia*, Latin *paenitentia*). Stoicism in particular was absorbed by the Church Fathers through the mediation of Cicero and Seneca. Of lasting historical significance was the influence of Cicero's *De officiis* on → Ambrosius. → Augustine adopted the cardinal virtues as forms of love toward God. The notion, not wide-spread in Antiquity, that virtue was not a human achievement but a gift from God, was given new meaning and justification in Christian theology in respect of specifically Christian virtues. → Conscience; → Ethics; → Happiness; → Political Philosophy; → Practical Philosophy; → Soul, theory of the; → STOICISM; → PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY

A.W. H. ADKINS, *Merit and Responsibility*, 1960; F.ALESSE, *La Stoa e la tradizione socratica*, 2000; J.ANNAS, *The Morality of Happiness*, 1993; F.BOURRIOT, *Kalos Kagathos – Kalokagathia*, 1995; M.CANTO-SPERBER, *Éthiques grecques*, 2001; K.J.DOVER, *Greek Popular Morality in the Time of Plato and Aristotle*, 1994; S.EVERSON (ed.), *Companions to Ancient Thought*, vol. 4, 1998; R.GEIGER, *Dialektische Tugenden*, 2006; C.GILL, *Personality in Greek Epic, Tragedy and Philosophy*, 1996; id. (ed.), *Virtue, Norms, and Objectivity*, 2005.; P.HADOT, *Exercices spirituels et philosophie antique*, 1993, 13–75 (English translation 1995); CH.HORN, *Antike Lebenskunst*, 1998, 113–145; D.S.HUTCHINSON, *The Virtues of Aristotle*, 1986; B.INWOOD, *Ethics and Human Action in Early Stoicism*, 1985; Id., *Getting to Goodness*, in: Id., *Reading Seneca: Stoic Philosophy at Rome*, 2005, p. 271–301.; T.IRWIN, *Plato's Ethics*, 1995; W.A.MEEK, *The Origins of Christian Ethics*, 1993; P.MITSI, *Epicurus' Ethical Theory*, 1988; M.NILL, *Morality and Self-Interest in Protagoras, Antiphon and Democritus*, 1995; R.SORABJI, *Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation*, 2000; P.STEMMER, s. v. T. (I.), *HWdPh* 10, 1998, 1532–1548; G.STRIKER, *Essays in Hellenistic Epistemology and Ethics*, 1996; M.VEGETTI, *L'etica e la filosofia antica*, 1989.

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**Virtus.** The Latin word *virtus* generally refers to the essence of 'man' (*vir*), expressed in particular as courage (on other meanings, cf. → Virtue). However, as a concept of social and ethical values, the Latin *virtus*

translated the Greek *areté*. In Christian usage, too, *virtus* comprises many different 'virtues' (Aug. Civ. 4,20). At Rome, V. was honoured as the goddess of 'manfulness', at first in association with → Honos. The circumstances of temple foundations and the cultic iconography of V. on Republican and Imperial coins (a helmeted female figure with a lance, her foot often resting on spoils of war) suggest a close connection with war and warfare. In 222 BC, M. → Claudius [I 11] Marcellus vowed a temple to V. and Honos before the Battle of Clastidium, but the *votum* (→ Votive offerings [II]) was only completed in 208 (Liv. 27,25,7–9) and the temple in front of the Porta Capena at Rome was finally dedicated in 205 BC (Liv. 29,11,14). It is probable that a *cella* with a cultic image of V. was simply added to an existing Temple of Honos, which had been built on the orders of Q. → Fabius [I 28] Maximus Rullianus in the late 4th cent. BC. A second temple of Honos and V. in front of the Porta Collina was commissioned after 133 BC by P. → Cornelius [I 70] Scipio Africanus. Very close by was a statue of V., which was struck by lightning in 38 BC (CIL VI 3735; Cass. Dio 48,43,4). C. → Marius [I 1] had a third temple built with the booty from his victories against the Cimbri on what would later be the site of the Arch of Titus (Cic. Div. 1,59). Pompey (→ Pompeius [I 3] Magnus) also had V. honoured, alongside other deities, in the temple that formed part of the theatre complex he had built. V. was one of the four 'Virtues' with which Augustus was honoured in 27 BC (R. Gest. div. Aug. 34,2), but V. appears seldom in Imperial coinage before AD 69.

→ Personification; → Virtue

W.EISENHUT, *V. Romana*, 1973; R.FEARS, *The Theology of Victory at Rome*, in: ANRW II 17.2, 1981, 736–826 (esp. 747f.); Id., *The Cult of Virtues*, in: ANRW II 17.2, 1981, 827–948, (esp. 859–861); T.GANSCHOW, s.v. V., LIMC 8.1, 273–281; L.RICHARDSON, *Honos et V.* and the Sacra Via, in: AJA 82, 1978, 240–246; A.ZIOLKOWSKI, *The Temples of Mid-Republican Rome*, 1992, 58f.

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**Virtutes dicendi** (ἀρεταὶ λέξεω/*aretai léxeōs*, 'virtues of verbal expression').

#### I. TERMINOLOGY AND SYSTEM II. DEVELOPMENT

##### I. TERMINOLOGY AND SYSTEM

The ancient teaching of the best use of linguistic tools (VD) pertains to the field of elocution (→ *elocutio*, λέξις/*léxis* or φράσις/*phrásis*), and proceeds on the premise of an attainable ideal, either intrinsically (in terms of the aesthetics of production) as the fulfilment of the regulations of a → *techne* (Latin *ars*) or extrinsically (in terms of the aesthetics of reception) as a successful process of persuasion (*persuadere*, πείθειν/*peíthein*; Quint. Inst. 2,15,12; [8]). In the course of the establishment of a rhetorical *ars*, the optimum elocution could no longer be measured solely by the orator's actual persuasive success, but also had to include an immanent system of rules or an accepted linguistic