Raqqa – Nikephorion/Callinicum, in: MDAI(Dam) 2, 1985, 133–162; M. Meineke, s.v. al-Raḳḳa, EI 8, 404–414; K. Toueir, s.v. Raqqa, ar-, The Oxford Encyclopedia of Archaeology in the Near East, vol. 4, 404–407.   AR.HA.

Rarus. Otherwise unknown author of an aphoristic epigram (the *Anthologia Planudea* attributes it to Palladas): an unfaithful friend is more to be feared than an open enemy (Anth. Pal. 10,121). The motif is quite common (see, e.g., Anth. Pal. 10,36; 95; 11,390; as early even as Thgn. 91 f.).   M.G.A.

Ras Šamra see → Ugarit

Rat. Graeco-Roman Antiquity did not distinguish between the → mouse and the rat. However, bone finds, excavations, etc. since 1975, in particular, have shown the presence of rats in the ancient Mediterranean area and elsewhere in Europe outside the Mediterranean area. According to the current state of research, the following can be regarded as proven:

a) The black rat (*Rattus rattus L.*), originating in Asia, had arrived in the Mediterranean region by the Hellenistic or early Imperial Period ([1. 132; 2. 62–63]; on the considerably earlier incidence of the house rat in the Near East, cf. [5]). It was advancing by the time of the early emperors (at the latest) into central and north-western Europe, too ([1]; [4. 265–267] argues a 'probably' much earlier incidence of the European house rat). The definite ancient finds farthest to the northwest and northeast respectively are in Britain and free Germania.

b) The brown rat (*Rattus norvegicus Berkenhout*), which also originated in the Far East, is probably the animal described in Ael. NA 17,17 and in the Babylonian Talmud [6. 277]. These texts refer to the region of the Caspian Sea and Mesopotamia. There is one definite find of the brown rat in Europe from the late Roman fort at Krefeld-Gellep [3. 387].

Ancient settlements, with their lack of refuse disposal and their houses often built of wood, offered ideal living conditions for the rat. Conditions were also thus created for the spread of certain human diseases (e.g., plague, murine typhus) to whose infection chain the rat belongs.

1 F. Audoin-Rouzeau, J.-D. Vigne, La colonisation de l'Europe par le rat noir (Rattus rattus), in: Rev. de Paléobiologie 13, 1994, 125–145   2 J. Boessneck, Die Tierwelt des Alten Ägyptens, 1988, 62–63   3 G. Sorge, Ratten aus dem spätantiken Kastell Krefeld-Gellep, in: Provinzialrömische Forschungen, Festschrift G. Ulbert, 1995, 387–395   4 M. Teichert, Beitrag zur Faunengeschichte der Hausratte, Rattus rattus L., in: Zschr. für Arch. 19, 1985, 263–269   5 E. Tchernov, Commensal Animals and Human Sedentism in the Middle East, in: J. Clutton-Brock, C. Grigson (ed.), Animals and Archaeology 3, 1984, 91–115   6 G. E. Thüry, Zur Infektkette der Pest in hellenistisch-römischer Zeit, in: P. Schröter (ed.), Festschrift 75 Jahre Anthropologische Staatssammlung München 1902–1977, 1977, 275–283.   G.TH.

Ratae. Roman fort in Britannia, built before AD 50 at the site of an Iron-Age settlement on the present-day Soar River and held for *c.* 20 years. The fort and its *vicus* grew into the core of a prosperous town (It. Ant. 477,4; Ptol. 2,3,20: Ῥάγε/Rháge; CIL VII 1169; cf. CIL XVI 160), present-day Leicester [1. 52 f.]. Already before AD 100, R. was the main city of the Coritani or Corieltauvi [2]. The forum and the basilica were built under Hadrian (AD 117–138), the baths in *c.* AD 150. Parts of the baths have survived as the Jewry Wall, as it is presently called [3]. Fortifications were added prior to AD 200. In the late 4th cent., town life diminished, but it was revived again after AD 700.

1 M. Todd, The Coritani, ²1991   2 J. S. Wacher, The Towns of Roman Britain, ²1995   3 K. M. Kenyon, Excavations at the Jewry Wall Site, 1948.

M. Hebditch, J. E. Mellor, Britannia, vol. 3, 1974, 1–83.   M.TO.

Ratiaria. Roman colony in Moesia superior, later the capital of Dacia Ripensis (→ Daci, with map), modern Arčar (oblast Vidin, Bulgaria). The settlement lay on the right bank of the Danube on the important road from Singidunum to Oescus and further eastwards. R. was the camp of the *Legio XIII Gemina* and the port of a river fleet (Not. Dign. Or. 42,43). There is evidence of an arms factory there (Not. Dign. Or. 11,38). Archaeological finds, inscriptions and coins.

V. Velkov, R. Eine römische Stadt in Bulgarien, in: Eirene 5, 1966, 155–175; TIR K 34 Sofia, 1976, 107.   J.BU.

Ratiocinatio see → Status

Rationalis see → rationibus, a

Rationality

A. Definition   B. 'From Mythos to Logos'
C. Sophists and Socratics   D. Plato and
Aristotle   E. Hellenistic and Roman philosophy   F. Christian Reception

A. Definition

The ancient concept of rationality cannot be tied to a single Greek or Latin term. First of all it must be distinguished from modern notions. The modern mind – both in general and in the sciences – is moulded by technological, economic, and administrative structures, and tends to equate rationality with 'goal-oriented rationality' (a rationality which focuses on means to reach a purpose). Given M. Weber's sociological distinction between goal-oriented, value-oriented, emotional, and traditional social action, goal-oriented rationality has become natural for modern man. This purely formal concept of rationality has frequently been criticized as over-simplified and impoverished in method or substance. Such criticism has led to renewed attempts to differentiate or rehabilitate concepts of rationality, for

instance by looking at the significance of language or history [21; 23; 44]. Yet, in all these variations, the modern philosophical conception of rationality (after HEGEL) differs from its ancient counterpart in that it refers to human abilities rather than to the essence of things. Rationality in the ancient sense denotes not only the specifically human capacity to think, which includes value-oriented, emotional or traditional elements, but also the ontological structure of the cosmos.

The various ancient forms of rationality can, to a certain extent, be divided into the tripartite Aristotelian scheme of theoretical knowledge (*theōría*, *sophía*, *epistḗmē*, *noûs*, *nóēsis*), practical knowledge (*práxis*, *phrónēsis*), and the productive disciplines (*téchnē*, *poíēsis*). Theory (viz. → physics, → mathematics and → metaphysics) deals with the eternal and necessary; practical and technical disciplines with the variable. From Plato onwards, reason or intuitive knowledge (*nóēsis*, Lat. *intellectus*) was distinguished from discursive reasoning (*diánoia*, Lat. *ratio*). The modern distinction between science and philosophy did not exist in antiquity.

B. 'FROM MYTHOS TO LOGOS'

The historical transition 'from *mythos* to *logos*' (to use NESTLE's [37] well-known phrase) was more diverse and less linear than assumed in earlier research [33]. It has been emphasized in recent years that various forms of rationality were also at the basis of mythical thought, even if they were not explicitly discussed or reflected upon. Although rationality as a philosophical discovery called into question the mythical mode of thought as can be found in the works of Homer and Hesiod, it remained, in part, dependent on religious tradition. Like the poets, the first Greek philosophers (called → Presocratics) were concerned with questions about Beginnings and Being (*tò ón*) in its entirety (*tò hólon*) as the divine (*tò theîon*). Furthermore, these philosophers used existing literary genres (especially didactic poetry) and thus a mixture of story-telling (*mŷthos*) and argumentative reasoning (*lógos*) [17]. In general, the imagery that is an essential part of philosophical language was is deeply rooted in the Greek poetic tradition. For example, the frequent use of the metaphor of 'light' bears witness to the close attachment of ancient thought to visible nature, as it is represented also in Greek poetry and art (Heracl. 22 B 6 DK; Pl. Phdr. 250d; Aristot. Metaph. 980a 25). There seems to have been a cross-fertilization rather than an opposition between *mythos* and *logos*. *Logos* does differ from *mythos*, however, by the demand for an argumentative account.

Theoría, the admiring/observing gaze, typically the observation of stellar constellations, was considered an end in itself and was considered the highest human activity (Aristot. *Protreptikos* fr. 6; Cic. Tusc. 5,3,8–9). Cosmic rationality, in the sense of a universal order, consists above all in the regularity of stellar and planetary motion and in the purposeful design of living be-

ings. These processes were explained by drawing analogies with the arts (*téchnai*) or human political phenomena such as war and justice [47].

In Presocratic thought, man did not have a unique position; an analogy between cosmic reason as macrocosm and human reason as microcosm was assumed (Democr. 68 B 34 DK; Aristot. Ph. 252b 26). In Heraclitus, *lógos* is a common thing, and there can be no truth in isolation from it (Heracl. 22 B 2; 50 DK; Pl. Phd. 90c). According to the Eleatics (Parmenides, Zeno), purely conceptual knowledge reveals the identity of thought and being. Moreover, → mathematics – being non-empirical and rational – was regarded by the Greeks as the epitome of science. For this reason the Pythagoreans (→ Pythagorean School) strove to create a system formulated in purely mathematical terms. Such an idea of totality, however, was often accompanied by a certain awareness of the limits of human knowledge. For example, the discovery of irrational numbers led to a qualification of a purely rational world view [3]. One important achievement of the rational thought is in fact the distinction between the sensible and the non-sensible or intellectual (Heracl. 22 B 28 DK; Alcmaeon 24 B 1 DK). Furthermore, the philosophers of the classical period (5th–4th cents. BC) were influenced by the recognition of the insecurity of the human condition as described by Greek poets from Homer to Euripides and Thucydides. For instance, the Orphic-Pythagorean movement introduced, by their dualism of body and soul, concepts of guilt and redemption and consequently the problem of evil (→ Orphism) [14].

Concepts of rationality were also being developed outside of philosophy, for example in medicine. In the Hippocratic writings (→ Hippocrates [6]), analyses of the natural causes of diseases led to the rejection of certain superstitions. This method of observation was, however, not completely empirical, but involved speculative generalization. Aristotle must be credited with initiating the systematic, empirical scientific research of anatomy and physiology – albeit not devoid of theory either – that was to be developed further in the Hellenistic period.

C. SOPHISTS AND SOCRATICS

The Sophists were the first explicitly to deny man's ability to know the essence of things (Gorg. *Helena* 82 B 11 DK, § 13). Consequently, they directed their attention to human/practical concerns, in particular rhetorical training. Thus the Sophists were the starting point of the enlightenment and the pedagogical revolution of the 5th cent. BC. The great debate of that age about nature (*phýsis*) and convention (*nómos*) was an essential part of the sophists' challenging of conventional morality. The crisis in science and ethics and the sophists' preliminary work on language paved the way for → Socrates' self-reflection and unbiased quest for the good – i.e. the virtuous and happy – life (*aretḗ*, *eudaimonía*; → Virtue; → Happiness). The Socratic method of question and an-

swer had an ethical as well as a logical motivation. It exposes untruth and half-knowledge and exhorts to a common search for real knowledge (Pl. Men. 84a-c; Pl. Tht. 148d–151d). The possibility of a just life rests on ethical insight arrived at in discourse. After Socrates, most philosophical schools viewed rationality not only as characteristic of clear and coherent discourse, but also as the condition for the way of life aspired to and known as caring for one's soul (*therapeía psychês*) [24].

D. PLATO AND ARISTOTLE

From Socrates onward, the Pre-Socratic connection between being, thought, and language was complemented by the further element of action. Cosmology and theology thus became inextricably linked with ethics. Man ought not only understand the cosmos, but emulate it. According to the Platonic and Aristotelian (as well as the Stoic) schools, the cosmos – understood as limited, animated, and teleological- culminates in the rational or the Mind (→ Cosmology, → World, → Theology) [30]. The mechanistic, non-teleological world view of the atomists (cf. → Leucippus [5], → Democritus [1]) remained very much a minority view in antiquity. According to this view, the rationality of the cosmos is very limited: the collisions of atoms moving in an infinite empty space occur at random.;

According to Plato, action is less closely linked to the true essence of things than speech and thought (*lógos*). It is only through language that men come to know of the transcendence of virtue (Pl. Resp. 473a). This is another reason why → virtue is knowledge (Pl. Phd. 68c–69c). Hence, language and thought necessarily result in the recognition of the transcendence of ideas (→ Ideas, theory of) and the foundation of ethics. The close ties between thought and language implied for both Plato and Aristotle equally close ties with the world of the community opened by language (→ Language, philosophy and theory of). Hence Plato's psychology of the affections, which is continued by Aristotle. Plato does not put forward an anthropology of pure reason as offered by the Stoics: conscious thought is the highest part of the soul, but does not constitute its entirety (→ Psychology). Plato's concept of rationality is not an abstraction from common experience, but emerges on the contrary from the forces of human striving (*érōs*: Pl. Symp. 209e–212a; Pl. Phdr. 250d). Lastly, rationality is for Plato the precondition of true political order: knowledge alone bestows political legitimacy (→ Political philosophy).

Aristotle makes a fundamental distinction between theoretical and practical reason, between ontology (or metaphysics) and ethics (Aristot. Eth. Eud. 1217b 2–1218a 38). In this way, he marks the choice between two distinct ways of life, the life of the mind (*bíos theōrētikós*, Lat. *vita contemplativa*) and the active life (*bíos praktikós*, Lat. *vita activa*). Theoretical knowledge (*theōría*) is an end in itself and is arrived at by deductive reasoning; practical knowledge (*phrónēsis*) focuses on action and is realized in individual decisions (Aristot.

Eth. Nic. 1140b 1–7; → Practical Philosophy; [21]). Aristotle's classification of the various fields of knowledge included the formalization of logic; hence, later on, the Hellenistic division of philosophy into three parts, → logic, → physics and → ethics.

E. HELLENISTIC AND ROMAN PHILOSOPHY

In the Hellenistic period, logic and the various sciences (e.g. geometry and → astronomy) made rapid progress. The more practically-minded Romans primarily adopted ethics. Epicurus' materialism and his ideal of an apolitical life met with great reservation in Rome (with the important exception of → Lucretius [III 1]), but the Stoic concept of rationality (*ratio*, *sapientia*) as constituting → virtue was eagerly adopted (Cicero, Seneca, Marcus [2] Aurelius). In this view, the purpose of human life is to live in accordance with nature, i.e. reason. A rational → cosmology is the necessary condition for the good life (M. Aur. 10,6). The absolute status of rationality in → Stoicism meant that the emotions were reduced to the status of mere disturbances of the soul (Cic. Fin. 3, 75–76), a thesis not found in Plato or Aristotle. Virtue (*virtus*) is the only thing of value for the happy life; freedom consists of complete self-control and peace of mind (→ *ataraxía*, Lat. *tranquillitas animi*). This strict doctrine of affections resulted in an abundant and engaging literature on the care of the soul, which deeply influenced all subsequent moral philosophy and → popular philosophy.

F. CHRISTIAN RECEPTION

The complex relationship between ancient philosophy and Christian revelation starts as early as the Pauline contrast between worldly wisdom and divine wisdom (1 Cor 1,18–25; 2,6–9; Col 2,8 f.). Philo's [12] and Origenes' allegorical method of interpretation and their de-historicization of biblical texts played an important mediating part in the fruitful assimilation of Graeco-Roman philosophy into Christianity (Aug. Doctr. christ. 2,60). The appropriation of important elements of Stoic ethics was also part of this process. Mediated by the Neo-Platonic concepts of *noûs* and *lógos*, the Christian concept of God was expressed in Neo-Platonic categories (Plot. 1,6; 6,9). In Plotinus, the eternal Platonic ideas became the thought of a primal mind (*Urvernunft*); in Augustine, they became ideas of God's mind. This shift and new foundation of the intelligibility of Being in the infinite *intellectus* of God also limited Greek rationality through the concept of the unfathomable will of an omnipotent God. Important for the Middle Ages was Boethius' Latin translation of the distinction between a higher intuitive faculty of knowledge (*intellectus*, *intelligentia*) and discursive knowledge (*ratio*, *ratiocinatio*). In general, the preference of the *vita contemplativa* over the *vita activa* had lasting consequences. On the other hand, by being made subservient to → theology, philosophy was primarily conceived as logical, conceptual analysis. Philosophy – whether conceived as preliminary to theology

or as an independent discipline – was detached from its practical dimension and objectives, and was no longer considered a way of life [25. 379–391]. This appears to be one of the causes of aggravation of the problem of the relationship, in philosophy, between theory and practice.

→ Epistemology; → Intellect; → Logic; → Logos

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Rationibus, a. Head of the central financial administration of the Roman Emperor and his subordinates. In the financial administration of the → princeps, at first privately organised and evolving already under Augustus, the entire system of revenues and expenditures was initially managed by a single → freedman. His title *a rationibus* is first attested for the reign of Tiberius; but the freedmen who managed the *breviarium totius imperii* for Augustus (Suet. Aug. 101,4) were probably already called like this. The functional importance of the department lent considerable weight to its director, as seen especially in the case of the Claudian freedman → Antonius [II 10] Pallas. From the reign of → Domitianus [1] at the latest, when the freedman Ti. → Iulius [II 1] was elevated to the equestrian class in his office of *a rationibus*, the function passed to equestrian officials, who at first received the rank of a → *ducenarius*, under Marcus Aurelius that of a *trecenarius*, and who lastly, in the 3rd cent. AD, were awarded the honorific title of *vir* → *perfectissimus*. Late in the 2nd cent., the term *rationalis* began to occur; it became more widespread in the 3rd cent. The *a rationibus* must be distinguished from the *procurator summae rei/ summarum*, who was employed in the 2nd half of the 2nd cent. as his assistant. In Late Antiquity, the office of the *rationalis* was absorbed into that of the → *comes rei privatae*, and the title *rationalis* survived only in the dioceses (the most important was the *rationalis Aegypti*); the office of the *procurator summarum* was transformed into that of the → *comes sacrarum largitionum*.

W. Alpers, Das nachrepublikanische Finanzsystem, 1995; R. Delmaire, Largesses sacrées et *res privata*. L'*aerarium* impérial et son administration du IVe au VIe siècle, 1989; W. Eck, Die Bedeutung der claudischen Regierungszeit für die administrative Entwicklung des römischen Reiches, in: Id., Die Verwaltung des römischen Reiches in der Hohen Kaiserzeit 2, 1997, 147–165, especially 151 ff.; Jones, LRE 411–437; P.R. C. Weaver, Familia Caesaris, 1972, 259 ff., 282 ff.   W.E. and K.G.-A.