

of the ethics of *Oneself as Another*. This is the best and most useful part of the book. The triadic analysis in terms of an Aristotelian teleology of the good life, a Kantian deontology of the norms that govern such a search, and the return to Aristotelian practical wisdom as the concretely situated attempt to resolve "the conflicts arising out of the deontological ethics in its path to concrete actions" (229), provides a helpful overview of both the substance and strategy of Ricoeur's ethics.

Like all of Ricoeur's work, his ethics is impressive. It is richly learned and subtly dialectical. It well may be, as Bourgeois claims, the most viable philosophical discourse about ethics in the wake of modernity. But the claim to have shown that in this book cannot be granted.

Merold Westphal

Fordham University

Limits and Possibilities of Contemporaneity

Günter Figal, Jean Grondin, Dennis J. Schmidt (eds.) *Hermeneutische Wege. Hans-Georg Gadamer zum Hundertsten*. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2000. 356 pp.

This important Gadamer Festschrift is composed of twenty contributions (all in German, and some in German translation) written by scholars from a dozen countries.¹ The volume is divided into four broad sections: *Memory* (1–83: C. Scott, N. Davey, D. BarbariĆ), *Antiquity* (87–146: H. Ruin, D. Di Cesare, J. J. Cleary), *Language* (149–240: J. Sallis, D. J. Schmidt, J. Risser, I. M. Fehér, J. Grondin, T. Schwarz Wentzer), and *Culture* (243–344: P. Kouba, H.-H. Gander, D. Janicaud, K. Wright, R. Brague, A. Honneth, F. Volpi, G. Figal). While some contributions examine Gadamer's hermeneutics and a few explicitly probe difficulties in it, many of them expand it by applying it to new problems. It is not possible to summarize all the papers separately, nor do full justice to any. I will proceed thematically, underlying two recurring themes: the limits of language and the recognition of otherness. In the last section of the review, I shall discuss the second theme by highlighting disagreements among contributors in an attempt to tackle difficulties in Gadamerian hermeneutics.²

Limits of Language

Hermeneutics as theory appears to be primarily a reflection on language. Contrary to analytic philosophy of language, however, the "linguistic turn" in hermeneutics does not consist of a reflection on language as an object *per se*. Rather it examines the limits of language and reflection itself, rehabilitating the natural, largely unreflective use of language in everyday life (Fehér, 193, 196). The limits of language are also those of reflection, as all reflection must itself be constituted in language (Fehér, 193, 195, 201; *GW* 8:408). Understanding is never purely conceptual, and theoretical statements are only an extreme case of language (Grondin, 217; *GW* 8:414). The hermeneutical experience *par excellence* is the awareness that we never succeed completely in expressing the question under discussion (*die Sache*) with adequacy; the right word always escapes us (Barbarić, 76; Gander, 260; Schmidt, 174; Ruin, 104).³ Understanding, whenever it occurs, is not the result of controlling reflection, but an anonymous event (Grondin, 208; Fehér, 192; Barbarić, 63).

Jean Grondin examines the rhetorical heritage in hermeneutics, the central importance of which is not fully elaborated in *Truth and Method* (207).⁴ Gadamer's treatment of the notion of incarnation in Augustine centers upon the implications of that teaching for the nature of language, namely, the materiality of the word: thinking exists only in its actual enactment (*Vollzug*) (213). This does not imply however that all thinking is reducible to uttered statements, since there always remains a difference between the external and the inner word; the former can never exhaust the latter, but only point to it. Of this enigmatic inner word nothing can be said, except that it is, or rather would be, the question under investigation when fully clarified. But such a clarification remains out of reach for our limited, human mind, incapable of pure divine self-presence (215; *TM*, 422; *GW* 1:426).⁵

The limits of language are paradigmatically illustrated by the problem of translation, which John Sallis discusses in his treatment of Schlegel's translation of Shakespeare. Ideally, the measure of translation is the reestablishment of the original meaning and intentions of the text. In practice, however, the translator often cannot satisfy this requirement, as this meaning has to be relocated in a new context and thus be interpreted: the identical meaning in many cases cannot be preserved but has to be transformed (151, 155-57). Indeed in the case of poetry, in which form and content are strictly inseparable, unity

of meaning and the so-called inner voice cannot possibly be preserved. In the case of poetry at least, as Sallis cautiously concludes, the restoration of meaning cannot serve as the measure or goal of translation (158).

Dennis Schmidt applies the thesis of the limits of language to the important question of the connection between thinking and moral life, as formulated by Kant. Kant's examination of the relation between reason and freedom presupposes a certain conception of language, namely, as the condition of generalization (164–65). However, the symbolical—the language of mystery—breaks the structure and logic of identity, and points to the limits of speech and conceptual knowledge in a way Kant had overlooked (165–71).⁶ Whereas the truth of the concept is expressed in the law, that of the symbol is in the freedom of the spirit (170–72).

Thomas Schwarz Wentzer, for his part, analyzes Gadamer's hermeneutics as a philosophy of the question. Contrary to analytic philosophy, and Ernst Tugendhat's variant of it, hermeneutics defends the priority of the question over the answer, of openness over the result (237). Understanding depends upon the reconstruction of a given question that establishes the dialogue (224). Hermeneutics takes up again the Socratic What-is question, which invites the interlocutor not only to give an answer, but also and above all to explore the question and persist in the inquiry (239). The question is a direction or a horizon for questioning, understood in continuity with Husserl's concept of horizon. The question has, moreover, the character of enactment: to understand what a question actually means, one must ask it oneself (238–40; *TM*, 369–79; *GW* 1:375–84).

Other papers concentrate on Gadamer's interpretative praxis, especially his interpretation of Plato. In *Truth and Method* Gadamer severely criticizes Plato's conception of language as formulated in the *Cratylus*. There he affirms that Plato's discovery of the ideas, by presupposing wordless knowledge of things, "covers up the essence of language even more fundamentally than the sophists did" (*TM*, 408; *GW* 1:412; Grondin, 210). Gadamer's verdict here clearly follows Heidegger's. But as Grondin points out, this is a one-sided exaggeration, incidently not repeated in his other writings. This is all the more astonishing given Gadamer's indebtedness to Plato, especially to the *Seventh Letter* and to the *Phaedrus*. In these texts, Plato defends a dialogical conception of language: every statement can always be taken out of its context, thus losing its hermeneutical-rhetorical meaning (Grondin, 209).⁷

Donatella Di Cesare's discussion of the *Cratylus* clarifies Gadamer's thesis of the continuity between dialectic (τέχνη διαλεκτική) and dialogue (διαλέγεσθαι) in Plato (116). Philosophy begins with Socratic questioning about what a thing is according to the name given to it. The question is invariably addressed to the interlocutor, and the inquiry concerns the meaning given to the name by the interlocutor (116). This dependence upon the interlocutor's approval constitutes the rhetorical dimension of dialectic, which Aristotle's demonstrative science will seek to overcome (123; cf. Figal, 340). Every λόγος itself is not mere naming; it is a synthesis and an interconnection; indeed it is dialectical in nature (127). Given the openness and freedom of dialogue, the dialectician, Di Cesare claims, "does not aim at forcing a definition that would be an end of λέγειν and διαλέγεσθαι" (128). John Cleary, in his learned paper on Plato's *Timeaus* and its first reception in the Old Academy, raises the question as to how two contemporaries of Plato (Xenocrates and Aristotle) could develop two diametrically opposed interpretations of the same dialogue, namely, a metaphorical and a literal one (144).⁸ The plurality of possible interpretations of the same text lies in both the many-sidedness of Plato's text and the various presuppositions of its readers. Moreover, the plurality of meanings in Plato's story about the emergence of the cosmos is not meant to give a final answer, but to stimulate further cosmological research (145).

Otherness and Reflexive Consciousness

Gadamer's hermeneutics stands as a theory of understanding and, more specifically, of understanding in relation to tradition.⁹ It has often been criticized for not accounting sufficiently for otherness in the encounter with the past or in understanding in general. Many contributors in this volume address, if only indirectly, such criticisms by radicalizing Gadamer's thinking in connection with Nietzsche, Heidegger, Derrida or psychoanalysis (e.g. Scott, 14–33; Davey, 35–62; Ruin, 104–6; Risser, 186–89). Alex Honneth for his part openly criticizes a central assumption of Gadamerian hermeneutics with arguments similar to those of Jürgen Habermas. In his analysis of Gadamer's review of Karl Löwith's *Habilitationsschrift*,¹⁰ Honneth challenges what he considers Gadamer's rejection of the role of reflexive consciousness. Whereas Löwith regards reflexive acts as the chance of decentralizing the self and as the condition for genuine intersubjective relations, Gadamer sees in them the purely negative aspect of distancing or objectiva-

tion (318). According to Gadamer, Kantian respect for the law contains a generalization of human beings that is incapable of recognizing the other in its particularity and for its own sake (*GW* 4:239). In this Honneth underscores Gadamer's alleged dependence upon the Heideggerian opposition between reflexive control and anonymous event (309, 315). Honneth goes so far as to speak of Gadamer's "strict rejection of all reflexive achievements" (318–19). Below I shall seek to determine to what extent this criticism is justified.

Günter Figal's paper, placed at the end of the volume, indirectly responds to misunderstandings and criticisms of Gadamerian hermeneutics, such as the criticism of Honneth's. Figal first recalls that *Truth and Method* formulates a primarily critical thesis against the monopoly of methodological consciousness by defending a conception of truth that exceeds the domain of scientific control (335). Franco Volpi's historical contextualization amplifies this central aspect. While the program of modern science and technology was originally meant to combat obscurantism and human alienation in favor of enlightenment and emancipation, this optimistic humanism progressively turned into an all-encompassing, dominating and exclusive form of knowledge (327). The historical sciences became in turn mere applications of the model of distanciation and neutrality. This overall positivistic tendency eventually led to a profound loss of meaning and therewith to a crisis in the humanities and in the world at large (326–30). This crisis called for Nietzsche's and Heidegger's radical critiques of modern science, which Gadamer further pursues, although in a less intransigent manner. Further, his hermeneutics is to be distinguished, Figal insists, from the deconstructivist movement represented by Vattimo, Rorty, and Derrida, notably by its recognition of the relevance of metaphysical questions.

Figal claims that hermeneutics does have a reflexive relation to tradition, which includes methodical caution, and that it stands in a fruitful tension between historical determination and the break from tradition (335, 336). It is certainly correct and important to underline, as does Figal, that historicization of tradition is the necessary condition in hermeneutics for explicit understanding and a clarification of one's own prejudices.¹¹ Gadamer does insist that our prejudices can become obstacles to understanding the voice of tradition.¹² He even speaks of the "tyranny of hidden prejudices that makes us deaf to what speaks to us in tradition" and underlines that "the important thing is to be aware of one's biases, so that the text can present itself in all

its otherness and thus assert its own truth against one's own fore-meaning" (*TM*, 269; *GW* 1:274).¹³ Such remarks suggest that Gadamer's hermeneutics really is not about the assimilation of meaning, but rather about the openness that permits the voice of the other to be heard.¹⁴

The reflexive, critical side of Gadamerian hermeneutics is undeniable and indeed needs emphasizing in the contemporary debate. On the other hand, this defense should not obscure an ambivalence in Gadamer's hermeneutics, namely, the problematic tension between reflexive consciousness and continuity of tradition. In fact, both the criticisms and the rejoinders just discussed throw light on a fundamental ambiguity inherent in Gadamerian hermeneutics. Reflexive consciousness, methodological and critical, tends to be compromised by Gadamer's equally insistent thesis of continuity of tradition and of our belongingness (*Zugehörigkeit*) to it. Tradition's prejudices, for Gadamer, are not only a challenge to our own presuppositions, they are also constitutive of them.¹⁵ In fact, the fundamental intention in *Truth and Method* remains, after all, to oppose an unduly theoretical conception of understanding, still dominating in the human sciences, and to rehabilitate prejudices of understanding, not as obstacle to, but as condition of, understanding (*TM*, xxviii; *GW* 2:438). Language is above all self-forgetful, and "only an 'unnatural' critical effort, which breaks the flow of speech and suddenly immobilizes something from this flow, can achieve consciousness and the explicit clarification of a word and its conceptual meaning" (*GW* 2:85; cf. Barbarić, 75). Gadamer does recognize the possibility of reflexive distancing but sees in it a moment of secondary importance, since reflective consciousness is "not the normal case when we understand."¹⁶ Thus, the hermeneutical conscience of temporal distance emerges *only when* tradition, which consists in part in handing down self-evident traditional material, has become questionable (*TM*, xxxiii; *GW* 2:443). For this reason, despite all his emphasis on distance and otherness, Gadamer's hermeneutics is primarily one of contemporary integration (*Aneignung, Integration*). Gadamer's choice for integration over historical reconstruction is discussed in *Truth and Method* as a decision for Hegel against Schleiermacher (*TM*, 164–69; *GW* 1:169–74).¹⁷ This emphasis on integration and the present compromises, however, the possibility of a reflective encounter with the tradition and the recognition of its otherness.¹⁸

What Otherness, Which Recognition?

As James Risser remarks, the apparent problem with Gadamer's hermeneutics of understanding is the transposition of otherness into some larger unity or universality, thus dissolving otherness (186). An important concession might indeed have to be made to the deconstructivist critique. The attempt to understand a foreign thought solely by means of application to one's own situation can hardly allow for an understanding of that meaning in its irreducible specificity. Gadamer himself appears to have conceded this difficulty in his late publications.¹⁹ While still holding the thesis that all understanding inevitably includes some application and integration, Gadamer admits the risk of doing violence to otherness and therewith the limits of his model.²⁰ On the other hand, Gadamer has never advocated the possibility of a complete grasp of the other that would be devoid of any differences. For Gadamer there is always something in the text that refuses to be integrated into a horizon and a unity.²¹ This lingering otherness corresponds to the historical difference between integration and original meaning. In that sense, Gadamer's hermeneutics attempts to reach an understanding, "without at the same time assimilating otherness in the known" (Risser, 188).²²

It is important to point out here that the notion of difference or otherness in both this volume and in Gadamer's hermeneutics is typically the radical difference that resists understanding. This notion corresponds to Gadamer's thesis that we always and inevitably understand differently (*immer anders verstehen*). This concept of difference is of a formal or structural character. It is the otherness recognized in principle in all understanding as the token of its very imperfectness and incompleteness. It is not, however, the historical difference grasped in its specificity and from which one can learn. Moreover, on account of his emphasis on continuity and belongingness, Gadamer often speaks of the otherness in the encounter with the past not as an object, but as an overall experience in which the interpreter is involved. The ultimate "object," if there is any, is the question under discussion or the workings of language itself (*TM*, 290; *GW* 1:295; Fehér, 203 n. 51; Gander, 257, 263).²³ This emphasis on the understanding of a common concern (*die Sache*) has the problematic result of relegating into the background the other, equally fundamental aspect of hermeneutical experience, namely, dialogue, and with it the otherness of the other. In Gadamer, at the moment of fusion there are not really two different

horizons, but only one. As he himself writes, the projection of a historical horizon is "only one phase" in the process of understanding; in the fusion of horizon, the historical horizon "is simultaneously superseded" (*TM*, 307; *GW* 1:312).²⁴ The fusion thus coincides with the dissolution of the historical horizon (Wright, 281). Indeed, given the thesis of continuity of tradition and of belongingness to it, Gadamer rejects the very possibility of there being really any isolated horizons at any time (*TM*, 306; *GW* 1:311). And yet the recognition of otherness necessitates the recognition of a historical horizon that is different from the horizon of the present.²⁵ Hence a fundamental crux in Gadamer's hermeneutics.

Kathleen Wright's and Rémi Brague's contributions point to some resolution of the problem. In establishing an instructive parallel between hermeneutics and Chinese philosophy, Wright makes the distinction between two hermeneutical moments: the passive moment of receptivity, when addressed by a question directed at us, and the active moment of reflection, when we attempt to answer the question (286, 291). As she points out, *Truth and Method* distinguishes between two kinds of judgments: the prejudices or traditional opinions that have been preserved and that allow for understanding, and prejudices that hinder understanding (cf. *TM*, 270; *GW* 1:275). In order for the fusion of horizons to take place, prejudices must be challenged and possibly overcome. Brague for his part distinguishes, in a parallel manner, between two models of reception of the past: inclusion and digestion, or integration. While the artificial process of inclusion preserves otherness, the natural process of digestion assimilates the other so deeply that the latter loses his or her integrity (294). Brague finds examples of these two models in the reception of Aristotle's works in the Middle Ages, namely, in the commentary, the one which included the original Greek text, as it was practiced at times in the West, on the one hand, and the paraphrase, which did not include the original text, as is mostly found in the Arabic tradition, on the other (298). The model of the commentary, which preserves the original (the original text) is the ancestor of modern philological and historical research.²⁶ The modern historian seeks to revive the past, but he or she does so *in vitro*, namely, by making the past come alive again, without however integrating it into the present (306). Reconstruction creates the impression that its narrative treats contemporary matters, while in reality this illusion is overshadowed by the feeling of distance. This kind of relation to its sources can thus appropriate other cultures without having to

digest them and need not suffer from dyspepsia as Nietzsche feared (305–6).²⁷

Brague's notion of understanding without contemporary integration helps to clarify the question of otherness in hermeneutics. Indeed, it provides a complement to Gadamer's single concept of appropriation or integration and application by making a distinction between two kinds of understanding (one conserving, the other integrating), thus reconciling Schleiermacher and Hegel. This also corresponds to Wright's distinction between passive and active understanding and what one may call two distinct moments of application. The first moment of application is a matter of taking the text, or other artefacts, seriously (as in the French *s'appliquer*); the second consists in accepting or rejecting either the complete text or this or that aspect of it. Historical reconstruction thus retrieves from forgetfulness questions and responses of the past so as to understand them first in their singularity. From this initial historical work arises the possibility of learning something new from these questions and responses, that is, specific ways of thinking capable of questioning us.²⁸

Historical reconstruction is often dismissed in contemporary debates in hermeneutics on at least two grounds. First, it allegedly presupposes an all-encompassing and unifying conception of tradition that fails to acknowledge the indissoluble difference in the text (cf. Ruin, 104). It would also appear to underestimate the active role of integration in understanding. However, even the mere recognition of otherness, if it is to be distinguished from understanding, must itself presuppose some kind of proportion, as opposed to sheer incommensurability, between present and past, familiarity and utter otherness. Moreover, as we have seen, the overemphasis on the active role of understanding, and of integration in the present, hinders the recognition of otherness. Furthermore, continuity, as the minimal condition of encounter between present and past, need not be conceived ahistorically. To be sure, it has to include some notion of humanity or human experience that cuts across cultural differences. This notion admittedly has yet to be elaborated towards a fuller hermeneutical theory. According to the second objection, historical reconstruction constitutes a purely antiquarian, self-forgetting enterprise devoid of interest for the present. In reality, as we have seen, the maintenance of distance is a condition for the preservation of otherness, while it does not yet decide in advance for or against its integration. A twofold division in understanding is possible insofar as right understanding is not synonymous with agree-

ment. Historical reconstruction—as far as realizable—proves necessary for the possibility of learning not only *through* but also *from* the otherness of the other. The initial inclusion of various, mutually complementary accounts is meant to lead to increased, and that is better, understanding. Receptivity and the suspension of one's prejudices is thus meant to permit some understanding of the other as a source of questioning and self-questioning.

This brief and selective review has given, I hope, an idea of the richness and importance of this international collection of essays in honor of Hans-Georg Gadamer. The volume's treatment of the two selected themes—the limits of language and the recognition of otherness—deepen and broaden the debate in hermeneutics, and in more ways than could be accounted for here. The question of the relation between these two themes—whether and to which extent a decisive emphasis on the limits of language is in tension with the needed recognition of specific otherness—would require further consideration.

François Renaud
Université de Moncton

NOTES

1. Gadamer's centennial birthday has been marked by other publications. See, for instance, "*Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache*": *Hommage an Hans-Georg Gadamer*, ed. R. Bubner (Frankfurt a.m.: Suhrkamp, 2001); *Begnungen mit Hans-Georg Gadamer*, ed. G. Figal (Stuttgart: Reclam, 2000); see also the following journals: *Continental Philosophy Review* 33 (2000), *Revue internationale de philosophie* 67 (2000), *Revista portuguesa de Filosofia* 56 (2000). Noteworthy are also two recent books by J. Grondin: *Einführung zu Gadamer* (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2000) and *Hans-Georg Gadamer: Eine Biographie* (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1999).
2. All references in the text of this review are either to this book (with page number, accompanied by the name of the contributor if the latter is not clear from the context) or to Gadamer's writings, quoted in English translation whenever available (mostly from *Truth and Method*, trans. J. Weinsheimer and D. G. Marshall, 2nd ed. [Crossroad: New York, 1989], cited as *TM*; then referencing the German original (*Gesammelte Werke* [Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1985-1995], cited as *GW*, followed by vol. and page).
3. Cf. Gadamer, *GW* 8:361; *GW* 2:148.
4. For a general, historical account of the relation between hermeneutics and rhetoric, see J. Grondin, "Die Hermeneutik und die rhetorische Tradition," in idem, *Von Heidegger zu Gadamer: Unterwegs zur Hermeneutik* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2001), 17-45, and K. Eden, *Hermeneutics and the Rhetorical Tradition* (New Haven/London: Yale University Press, 1998).
5. For further considerations on the inner word in Gadamer, see M.-A. Ricard, "Le verbe intérieur au sein de l'herméneutique de Hans-Georg Gadamer," *Laval théologique et philosophique* 57 (2001): 251-60.

6. On the question of the status of language in Kant, see also D. Di Cesare, "Hat Kant über die Sprache geschwiegen?" in *Language Philosophies and the Language Sciences*, ed. D. Gambarara et al. (Münster: Nodus Publikationen, 1996), 181-200.
7. This positive appreciation is formulated in the other section of *Truth and Method* devoted to Plato: "The Model of Platonic Dialectic" (*TM*, 362-69; *GW* 1:368-75). For a discussion on Gadamer's ambivalent attitude toward the Greek philosopher, see P. C. Smith, "Plato as Impulse and Obstacle in Gadamer's Development of a Hermeneutical Theory," in *Gadamer and Hermeneutics*, ed. H. J. Silverman (New York/London: Routledge, 1991), 23-41. For a general account of Gadamer's interpretation of Plato, including critical considerations, see F. Renaud, *Die Resozialisierung Platons: Die platonische Hermeneutik Hans-Georg Gadamer* (Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag, 1999).
8. For the reception of Plato in antiquity, see H. Tarrant, *Plato's First Interpreters* (New York: Cornell University Press, 2000).
9. In the preface to the second edition of *Truth and Method* (1965), Gadamer defends himself against the charge of traditionalism, while conceding the decisive role of the past in his hermeneutics: "I shall not deny, however, that—among all the elements of understanding—I have emphasized the assimilation [*Aneignung*] of what is past and of tradition" (*TM*, xxxvii; *GW* 2:447).
10. K. Löwith, *Das Individuum in der Rolle des Mitmenschen. Ein Beitrag zur anthropologischen Grundlegung der ethischen Probleme* (München 1928), now in idem, *Sämtliche Schriften*, bd. 1 (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1981). Gadamer's review from 1929 is now to be found in *GW* 4:234-39, under the title "Ich und Du (K. Löwith)".
11. See also G. Figal, "Phänomenologie der Kultur: Wahrheit und Methode nach vierzig Jahren," in "*Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache*": *Hommage an Hans-Georg Gadamer*, 103; idem, *Der Sinn des Verstehens: Beiträge zur hermeneutischen Philosophie* (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1996), 23-25.
12. M. Theunissen, "Philosophische Hermeneutik als Phänomenologie der Traditionsaneignung," in *ibid.*, 83 n. 17.
13. Cf. *TM*, 305; *GW* 1:310; *TM*, 306; *GW* 1:311.
14. J. Risser, *Hermeneutics and the Voice of the Other* (New York: SUNY Press, 1997), 10.
15. This aspect has been emphasized by R. Bernasconi in his criticism of Gadamer's hermeneutics: R. Bernasconi, "You don't Know What I'm Talking About: Alterity and the Hermeneutic Ideal," in *The Specter of Relativism: Truth, Dialogue and Phronesis in Philosophical Hermeneutics*, ed. L. K. Schmidt (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1995), 193.
16. Quotation from a letter of Gadamer to Emilio Betti, February 19, 1961, published in E. Betti, *Die Hermeneutik als allgemeine Methodik der Wissenschaften* (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1962), 51 n. 118.
17. For a detailed discussion on this confrontation (and a defense of Schleiermacher's hermeneutics), see Y. LaFrance, "Notre rapport à la pensée grecque: Gadamer ou Schleiermacher?" in *L'avenir de la philosophie est-il grec?* ed. C. Collobert (Montréal: Fides, 2002), 39-64.
18. M. Theunissen, "Philosophische Hermeneutik als Phänomenologie der Traditionsaneignung," 79.
19. See, for instance, *GW* 1 (1986): 305 n. 230.
20. Cf. J. Grondin, "La rencontre de la déconstruction et de l'herméneutique," in *Philosopher en français: Langue de la philosophie et langue nationale* under the direction of Jean-François Mattéi (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2001), 244.
21. J. Risser, *Hermeneutics and the Voice of the Other*, 80-81.
22. Risser, *ibid.*, 137.
23. Cf. *TM* 276; *GW* 1:281. Cf. L. K. Schmidt, "Respecting others: The hermeneutic virtue," *Continental Philosophy Review* 33 (2000): 364, 368.

24. On this, see L. Schmidt's defense emphasizing the projecting of the historical horizon, and Bernasconi's criticism that sees in the fusion, rightly, I believe, the final phase and dissolution of otherness: L. K. Schmidt, "Respecting others: The hermeneutic virtue," 371; and R. Bernasconi, "'You don't Know What I'm Talking About': Alterity and the Hermeneutic Ideal," 187.
25. Rissler, *Hermeneutics and the Voice of the Other*, 81.
26. It should be pointed out that Brague's parallelism between commentary-paraphrase and inclusion-digestion pertains primarily to the material access to the text and therewith to the condition of possibility of interpretation, not to interpretation *per se*. As we know, the emergence of philology in the Renaissance has not prevented a continued common practice of integration (or digestion) in interpretative practice. Only with the emergence of historical consciousness in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries is the attempt made to secure the full methodological basis of historical reconstruction.
27. Cf. R. Brague, "Élargir le passé, approfondir le présent," *Le Débat* 72 (1992): 29-39; idem, *Europe, la voie romaine*, 3rd ed. (Paris: Gallimard, 1999).
28. Cf. L. K. Schmidt, "Respecting others: The hermeneutic virtue," 367.